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I should no doubt begin by defining what I mean by the two nouns 
in the title of this paper. But were I to do so, I should need a book 
lather than an essay in which to explain what I am talking about. For 
it is a tradition in philosophy to push matters back to their logical be- 
ginnings and that would be impossible within any reasonable number of 
words. Assuming then that we know what we are talking about-an 
admittedly shaky assumption-let me say that my purpose here is to 
suggest how philosophy is sometimes guided by common sense and 
sometimes common sense is guided by philosophy. 
e all grow up with a set of ideas, logical principles, rules for think- 
whose origin is more or less obscure. We do not invent our lan- 
guage but inherit it from others. But language, as is granted by almost 
everyone nowadays, is itsex a sort of philosophy, concealing or express- 
ing, according to one's views, a peculiar metaphysics. Professors of lit- 
erature are accustomed to studying the special figures of speech which 
dominate certain writers and sometimes these figures of speech are com- 
mon to a literary era. The lark that mounts to Heaven's gate is no in- 
vention of Shakespeare's nor are the twin pools which stand for eyes. 
But the prevalence of figures of speech need not be sought in liter- 
ature. We all know how certain slang expressions arise, extend themselves 
through a social class, and then fade away. We also know how certain 
words come into fashion and then go out of fashion. I doubt very much 
whether such fashions express anything whatsoever beyond the desire 
for social conformity. One gains the esteem of one's social group by 
doing what they do, wearing the same kind of clothes as they wear, 
attending the same lectures, reading the same books, playing the same 
games, and naturally enough speaking the same speech. So at times 
certain types of philosophical problem come into fashion, at the present 
linguistic, and aesthetic. As far as I know, no one is studying 
blems of God, freedom, and immortality, which were of such im- 
e to Kant. "No one" in this context means "very few," for there 
ys a survival from past eras which remains to plague the general- 
cultural history. It is safe to say that historians of philosophy 
(61) 
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have become almost extinct, though there are still a few specimens left 
about as many as there are of whooping cranes. 
3 
Linguistic style, if it is symptomatic of anything, indicates a state of 
mind, not a set of ideas in the sense that declarative sentences may be 
said to express ideas. But at the same time most of us do submit to 
the almost universal syntactical rules of the language which we are 
trying to speak and i t  is here that some writers have imagined that 
they could unearth a concealed philosophy. Thus in English and, as far 
as I know, in all Indo-European languages, we use common nouns and 
adjectives. These are obviously symbols for cIasses of things and events, 
not for individuals. They obviously select groups of beings and do not 
differentiate the members of the groups from one another. Moreover, 
in modem languages nouns and adjectives have no tenses, though in some 
Amerindian languages they do. When we say the noun Izotrse, we leave 
out all reference to when it existed or exists or will exist, and if we 
wish for some reason or other to bring in dates, we have to do so 
either by using a peculiar tense of the verb or by some adverbial phrase. 
We distinguish in this way between the temporal series and that which 
takes place in it, as we say. We do not integrate time into the being 
of things, This, I hope, is obvious. 
Moreover, our common nouns and adjectives specify no location in 
space. And when we wish to indicate spatial situations, we again have 
to resort to adverbial qualifiers. In Japanese one says this-here-house, 
that-there-house, and that-house-way-over-there. But in English we talk as 
if the things of which we are speaking were unconditioned by their where- 
abouts or their dates, a house or a dog being just as domiciliary or canine 
wherever they may be found. Yet one classical theory of epistemology, 
that based on sensory data, overlooks the indisputable fact that location 
in time and space determines what one will perceive, even, in the case 
of vision, the traditional source of sensory data, determining size and 
shape. In this way by reflecting upon our language, at least upon one 
kind of language, we discover that we speak as if we believed that there 
are certain beings which are inherently spaceless and timeless. There 
is surely no need here to do more than say that the universals em- 
bodied in language are without individuality, though with specificity. 
They are related to particular things in time and space in a way that 
has never been satisfactorily explained except in the eyes of the ex- 
plainer. 
If it were possible to have a language in which all the words were 
particularized, so that one could not speak of a dog or a house, but 
only of, let us say, my-house-here-and-now, and if each of the verbal 
symbols were as different from what they are in English as the symbols, 
Abraham Lincoln or George Washingtort are different, then there could be 
PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE 63 
no problem of universals since there would be no universals whatso- 
ever. We do have a language which is composed exclusively of general 
terms, the language of mathematics, and I am told that very primitive 
languages are much more particularized than ours. If the symbol for 
my-yesterday-knife and my-today-knife do not both include the symbol 
for knife, there is little likelihood of anyone's abstracting either from the 
in question or from the perception of those objects any common 
property. But that does not mean that a person speaking such a lan- 
mage would not know what a knife was. In an antithetical case we use 
;ne word address both for the name of where one lives and for a speech, 
but we seldom, if ever, confuse the two. So, though we still differen- 
tiate amongst babies, adolescents, and adults, we nevertheless can recog- 
nize the personal identity of a human being at his various periods of life. 
The problem of universals does not arise in mathematics until someone 
tries to apply it within limits to the spatiotemporal world. The problem 
right out of the conflict between what we call experience and uni- 
s and what I am calling here common sense. 
mmon sense sets the problem here because we see a discrepancy 
en its data and those of theory. We are living in space and time 
and suddenly become aware of beings that do not appear to be spatio- 
temporal. We are confronted with particulars and suddenly discover that 
they exemplify in some mysterious manner universals. And if we say, 
as some philosophers have said, that we are also confronted with uni- 
versals and actually come face to face with the nonspatial and nontem- 
poral here and there and, it goes without saying, at precise moments of 
time, then we have to explain how a timeless being can intrude into the 
world of time and not take on a date. For such intrusions occur at 
certain moments. And if we say that universals are only words, then we 
have to explain why particulars obey the dictates of those words. We can 
call things anything we please, but whether we call something by a 
great variety of names or not, we have to recognize it as having certain 
persistent traits which it shares with other things. And our old problem 
is before us again. For how are we to describe the sharing of common 
rties without involving universals? 
are thus in the position of granting that here a philosophic prob- 
rises out of common sense. But we also have to grant that we shall 
not be satisfied with any solution of the problem which cannot be veri- 
fied by common sense. But if in considering the rise of the problem we 
mean linguistic usage by common sense, we surely do not mean that when 
we are talking of verification. If we are talking about linguistic usage, 
then clearly there is caninity as well as dogs. But though it may be 
argued that the problem of the reality of universals arises because we 
use such a word as "caninity," and define it in general terms, it is not 
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solved by pointing to the word. Before we can answer this question 
we have to have criteria of reality and those criteria are not to be found 
in grammars and dictionaries. It is not in a course in English Composi, 
tion that one learns that dreams, hallucinations, optical illusions, ghosts, 
and negative afterimages are unreal. Nor is it through any experience of 
this set of unrealities. We discover that something perceived is unreal 
by comparing it with something that is real, not by simply looking at 
it. For no experience by itself, isolated from the total mass of our memo. 
ries, ever says anything about its own reality. Judgments of reality are 
made after the event. One has to stop to think before passing on the 
reality of any experience. Our illusions would not mislead us if they an- 
nounced their illusory nature as soon as they appeared before us. It is 
because we already know so much that we are seldom misled by the corn. 
mon illusions of perception. No one by experience uncorrected by think- 
ing could have announced that the earth moves round the sun. If then 
we say that the sun is really stationary, it is not because of simple 
visual experience. We are constantly correcting our experience by means 
of what we know of science and philosophy. 
One set of these criteria is certainly reflected in and stimulated by 
language. I refer to our growing use of abstractions that accompanies 
step by step the spread of natural science. What has been called the sci- 
ence of envelops is an example of this. The word "envelop" is used to 
name those more inclusive terms that have to be used as, for instance, 
biology is absorbed into chemistry, chemistry into physics, physics into 
mathematics. But science also has evolved in the direction of more in- 
clusive or general laws. The stock example of this is physics, which up 
to the time of Newton had two sets of laws, one for sublunary and an- 
other for superlunary motions. But similarly in chemistry, until 1828 
when urea was synthesized, there had to be two sets of laws, one for in- 
organic and another for organic substance. If then the name of a thing 
is made to connote its most general traits, those which it shares with 
other things, scientific names will become as abstract as nonscientific 
and for the purposes of science such abstractions may become essential. 
For when it is of interest to make deductions, one has to have gen- 
eral propositions. In logic it is a case of all or none; in science it may 
be a case of most or almost none. In order to attain generalities, one 
has obviously to overlook those traits which distinguish one thing from 
another, and hence one has to develop techniques for overlooking them, 
These techniques are those of the laboratory. Fortunately for the philos- 
opher, laboratory conditions are set up deliberately and for stateable pur- 
poses; they do not simply occur. And most scientific laws, when accurate- 
ly phrased, include the conditions under which they are true. If I am 
not being too cynical, I should say that laboratory conditions are the 
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tions under which scientific laws become true. Moreover, when an 
of a recognizable type occurs outside of a laboratory, such as a 
falling off a roof, a scientist is supposed to be able to explain why 
be law is not strictly obeyed. His explanation consists in measuring the 
difference between laboratory and nonlaboratory conditions. As primi- 
tive observers we first see each object as an individual thing and our 
classifications are originally made by our parents, siblings, and friends. 
We learn what to call things, what their names are, and presumably these 
names were applied because certain characteristics were selected as most 
important. Why they were important is now undiscoverable, though some- 
times one's imagination helps. We can perhaps discover why children call 
railroad trains choo-choos and dogs bow-wows. We can also imagine that 
things that are irrelevant to the interests and knowledge of daily life 
are all lumped together, as children lump all numbers over a few as "a 
lot." When scientists first classified material objects as earthy, aerial, aque- 
ous, and fiery, we no longer know what was their motive. But it must 
have taken a tremendous expansion of the scientific imagination to think 
of all substances as combinations of four. And a similar expansion of the 
imagination must have been required for Aristotle to reduce the complex- 
ity still further by making heat and moisture primary, defining cold and 
dryness as the simple absence of their opposites. The theory of the four 
eIements, which gave rise to one of the most harmonious and general of 
theories, lasted well into the eighteenth century and was a triumph of 
science and philosophy over common sense. But it too had to meet the 
challenge of common sense. Experience, whatever its high status in em- 
pirical philosophies, is always a challenge to a philosopher for it refuses 
to behave as philosophers say it should. The discrepancies between com- 
mon sense observation and scientific theory always exist and there is no 
rule that has as yet been formulated for telling a man when he must 
ct one by the other. 
etimes philosophy corrects common sense instead of subjecting it- 
it. But again we have to ask in what the correction consists. No 
can deny the data of the visual world. They are simply there and, 
gh we can explain them, we cannot explain them away. The conec- 
on must not be of the type which attributes them to a diseased mind. 
And I think I am right in saying that it first consists in accepting the 
tangible and ponderable object as the real one and then showing the con- 
ditions under which it will change its visual shape and size. I have been 
told by physicists that one could start with visual objects as real and in- 
terpret the behavior of tangible and ponderable ones as deviations from 
the visual norm. But I have also been told that such a system would be- 
come too complicated to be tolerated. If this is so, the criterion of sim- 
plicity is of primordial importance and should be examined. When Osi- 
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ander says, in his introduction to Copernicus' Revolutions of tlze Heav- 
enly Spheres, that nature always follows the simplest course, he means 
apparently a course that can be described with as few presuppositions 
and indefinables as possible. If one can define an event as a function of 
two variables, one has discovered something simpler presumably than a 
course that can be defined only in terms of three variables. But who can 
deny that the simplicity herein is not so much nature's as ours? Again, 
when Locke defined the real objects of the world in terms of those prop. 
erties which were sufficient, if not necessary, for the construction of 
Galilean physics, he too simplified nature in the sense of reducing the 
number of its properties and correlating all other observable properties 
with change in human observation. But Locke thought he knew that the 
mind could know only ideas and that knowledge was the organization of 
ideas. And since he flatly refused to examine the mechanism by which 
ideas arose in the mind, but limited himself to studying the ideas after 
they had arisen, he was able to avoid many of the puzzles which his 
successors became mired in. 
If common sense were to intervene at this point, it would observe 
that by this act of Locke's, at least three levels of beings were estab- 
lished: (1 ) the level of the Galilean properties; (2) the level of sensory 
qualities; and ( 3 )  the level of images, hallucinations, dreams, and il- 
lusions. These levels seem to be established by the degree of common- 
ness of what is perceived: the Galilean properties are available to all 
observers under definable conditions; the secondary qualities are detec- 
tible only when a human mind is one of the variables of which they are 
functions; the third level is observable only to a single person at a time. 
Students who have taken even elementary courses in the history of phi- 
losophy will remember how Berkeley and Hume reduced these levels to 
one. That one was what Hume called the shifting theater of perception, 
in which there was no reason to believe either in a perceiving mind or 
in any causal relations in the ordinary sense of that term. As far as I 
know, the reasoning to this position was accurate, granting the presup- 
positions, and if Hume had camed it on to what we-who have the 
advantage of living two centuries later than he-would call its Iogical 
conclusion, he would have ended with that purely theoretical philosophy 
known as the solipsism of the present moment. 
The strange thing about this conclusion is that when we have reached 
it, as Santayana did in the first part of Scepticism and Animal Faith, 
we immediately try to escape from it. We have a curious and perhaps 
unjustified feeling that though logically sound, there must be something 
wrong with it. We ask how we can prove the existence of other peo- 
ple's minds, of the past and the future, of the wall behind our backs, 
of the chair in the room next door. Nor does it occur to us that if the 
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tion is sound, such questions ought not even to occur to us. Why 
Id we have this curious feeling? In fact, we might even ask how we 
could say that only I exist at this moment, if we did not believe that 
there were other minds to be distinguished from ours, other times from 
which the present is set off? This feeling is surely not the result of any 
beoretical considerations; it comes straight out of common sense. More- 
over, one can hardly avoid asking the source of the rules by which we 
this apparently unsatisfactory conclusion. If we engage in extrap- 
olations of our present experience into the past and future and other 
*egions of space, where does the technique of extrapolation itself come 
from? Surely not from immediate observation. When one sees a patch 
of red, one does not and cannot deny that he sees it. He raises questions 
about it only when he tries to say something about it which goes beyond 
its redness. But why should he feel constrained to go beyond its redness, 
if only to ask what it is that is red? Only, I suggest, because one of the 
undeniable and persistent traits of our experience, whether perceptual or 
not, is its temporaI dimension. We can no more divest ourselves of what 
common sense calls our memory than we can of the colors, sounds, 
tastes, and textures that arise before us. 
Philosophers are rational people who work themselves into comers, not 
by committing fallacies, but by avoiding them; that can be said in their 
praise. But once they have got themselves into a corner, they seem un- 
willing to remain there and look for all sorts of devices by means of 
which they can escape. This is quite unlike what other rational people 
usually do. When we are told, for instance, that white light is a combina- 
tion of all the spectral colors, absurd as this seems to common sense, 
we accept it as true. And when we are told that solid objects consist 
largely of empty space, we swallow that also and do not try to prove 
that empty space is really full. When we see great oaks from little acorns 
growing, we may wonder how it is possible, but we do not deny its pos- 
sibility. And if someone were to maintain that great oaks could also grow 
from gloxinia seeds, and proved it by rigidly controlled experiments, re- 
peating them in the traditional way, botanists would have to sigh and 
admit that it was true. Only intellectual Tories would insist that in real- 
ity the acorn was the real oak seed and that the oaks which grew out 
of the gloxinia seeds were illusions. It must not be denied that such in- 
tellectual Tories have existed-the history of the Copernican theory, of 
evolutionism, of the mechanical theory of heat, of indeed almost all scien- 
tific theories is evidence enough of the reluctance of the human race to 
accept the evidence for novelty. But sooner or later, unless such theories 
are disproved, and let us omit a discussion of what the disproof of a 
scientific theory consists in, they win out and are taught in textbooks as 
commonly accepted opinions. But no one to speak of ever accepted 
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solipsism seriously in spite of the fact that no one could find a flaw 
in the argument leading to it. 
When philosophers like Santayana introduce something called animal 
faith as a basis for our belief in those things for which we have no 
rational evidence, they say no more than if they had simply introduced 
common sense. Of course we believe in other people's minds, the room 
next door, a world of external objects, and all the rest. Without indulg- 
ing in any intellectual tricks, let me say that whether one calls this kind 
of belief common sense or not, is a matter of indifference. What is not 
a matter of indifference is that there exists a set of beliefs which we 
have to justify and that it is not a set which we reach through demon- 
stration, reasoning, experimentation, or revelation. This set of beliefs can 
be phrased as a set of propositions which do not demand proof and 
which act as the criteria of satisfactory theorizing. By this I mean that 
I do not have to prove the existence of the past or of the other things 
of whose existence certain epistemological theories raise doubts, unless we 
have already reached the conclusions that they do not exist. If I conclude 
that there is no past or no external world, I have the choice of going 
no further or of going back and trying to discover where my reason- 
ing went astray. But the suspicion that my reasoning did go astray is 
what is of interest. It could not have happened because of the train of 
thought which led to the unsatisfactory conclusions, for if it had, I might 
have caught it in the act. I have obviousIy accepted a set of ideas as 
standard truths and use them to check my reasoning. We might be ex- 
pected to say in philosophy that if we come out with no externaI world, 
no past, no future, no distant space, and so on, we have either com- 
mitted an error in reasoning or that common sense has been in error. 
No proof is needed that frequently common sense has indeed been er- 
roneous. To common sense the earth is flat, the sun moves through the 
skies from east to west, the moon waxes and wanes, and eels are gen- 
erated from horsehairs. It might be expected to be wrong here too. 
There are only two ways of critically examining an argument. One is 
to look at the premises and see whether they are acceptable or not; the 
other to look at the reasoning and see whether it is fallacious, I am as- 
suming here, with most of my colleagues, that the reasoning of the sol- 
ipsist is correct. We must therefore turn to the premises. And if the 
conclusions are to be tested by their harmony with common sense, then 
it might be expected that the premises would be similarly tested. If we 
want to prove that there is a room next door, we had best choose prem- 
ises which will not make it impossibIe to do so. Among those premises 
must be the criteria by means of which we can tell whether a room 
exists or not. If we want to know what flag is flying from the mast of 
a ship, we must know what certain flags look like before we guess. And 
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must know this before we make our guess, That knowledge 
not possibly arise out of the immediate data of sense. But if 
ant this, we have to grant also that knowledge or, if you prefer, 
f has a history in everyman's biography. 
estions of this sort often arise because of the discrepancy between 
we are seeing and what we expected to see. If we see a ship 
the flag flying upside down, we cannot tell what it signifies unless 
now the code. And I venture to say that it is not the sight of the 
upside down that raises the question in our minds but the expecta- 
that it ought to be flying rightside up. The perceptual data in them- 
s are utterly inarticulate until they have been interpolated into a 
r set of data which have been previously interpreted or given con- 
onal significance. They are made to "say" something when their ap- 
ance can be inferred from other things as a rule, but no rule can 
on the single occurrence of any set of data, however com- 
e must be a long series of repeated events for the estab- 
ment of rules and no one can be confident that he has the right 
unless his experience is corroborated by that of other people. For 
as our language assumes the existence of time and of other peo- 
minds, so do our processes of verification. 
e question of whether the sensory data are subjective or objective 
relevant to the truth of knowledge in the sense of judgment. All 
is required is that they occur in a regular and predictable man- 
All that the scientific investigations of their origin proves is that 
are functions of two variables: material stimuli, causes, sources, what 
ill, in the nonhuman world, and the whole perceptual apparatus of 
an beings. Neither alone will suffice. But if we are talking about 
ge in the sense of assertions or judgments, the sensory data 
both the criteria of truth and error, and also the stimuli to ques- 
But both as criteria and as stimuli to questions, they are just 
b things when isolated from human interests, A single color, red, 
y be evidence of a large variety of statements and similarly a com- 
tion of sensory data may be required to prove a single simple state- 
t. It takes but a few moments' reflection to show that there is no 
ibility of making a one-to-one correspondence between sensory data 
possible judgments. 
ave space I shall say nothing of certain other metaphysical as- 
ts of Indo-European languages, such as those involved in the subject- 
ate proposition, the necessity of subjects for verbs, and the reifica- 
of processes. It is more important to emphasize something which 
t inherently linguistic, the social element in knowledge. We demand 
all truths be interpersonal. Just as we assume that anyone with the 
er training can repeat someone else's experiments, and that no ex- 
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periment can be accepted until it has been repeated, so we assume that 
any belief must be corroborated by others if we are to accept it. That 
there is such a thing as what used to be called an inner life is no doubt 
true, but it is of little use so long as it cannot be communicated. Such 
experiences as ~eligious conversions, the beatific vision, the delusions of 
the mentally diseased, are of course experienced by only one person at 
a time. They clearly are no more interpersonal than a toothache. But 
what should concern the philosopher is not so much their privacy as the 
need their possessors feel of telling other people about them. The writing 
of lyric poetry, for instance, has the paradoxical factor of exteriorizing, 
as the French say, that which is internal. The situation suggests that we 
do not trust our own direct experience until it is shared by another. 
The anguish which is felt when the attempt at communication fails to 
reach its end is characteristic of the situation. It  is as if one felt that 
experience must be shared or remain illusory. Thus common sense as- 
sumes without question not only the existence of other minds, but their 
function as witnesses to the truth of anybody's opinions. 
I make no claim to having done anything more than state a problem. 
Common sense creates problems for the philosopher and also answers 
them. The many mansions of religion will have to be granted a place 
in philosophy as well. But to the man whom this volume is supposed 
to honor, this will not prove embarrassing. 
